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Attorneys' Fees-PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION-ABSENT STATU- 
TORY AUTHORIZATION, FEDERAL COURTS MAY NOT AWARD FEES 
UNDER THE "PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL" EXCEPTION-Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
In March 1970, three environmental groups1 (collectively re- 
ferred to as Wilderness Society) instituted an action seeking de- 
claratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Inte- 
rior in an attempt to prevent issuance of permits required for the 
construction of the trans-Alaska oil ~ i p e l i n e . ~  In a four-to-three 
decision, the court of appeals reversed3 a district court judgment 
for the Department of the Interior and intervenor Alyeska Pipe- 
line Service Company (Alyeska) .4 Congress subsequently enacted 
legislation which terminated the merits of the litigation by allow- 
ing issuance of the permits sought by Alyeska? 
Turning to Wilderness Society's request for an award of at- 
torneys' fees, the court of appeals held that by bringing the suit 
Wilderness Society ensured proper functioning of the government 
system and vindicated important statutory rights of all  citizen^.^ 
Although the United States and the State of Alaska were not held 
liable, Alyeska was required to pay one-half of the reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred by Wilderness Society in performing the 
function of a "private attorney general."' 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that since Congress 
1. Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends of the Earth. 
2. The suit was brought on the ground that the proposed right-of-way and special 
land use permits violated the statutory width restrictions of the Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act of 1920, § 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), and the environmental impact study require- 
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, §§  91 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§  4321 
et seq. (1970). 
3. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 
U.S. 917 (1973). 
4. Alyeska's stock is owned by ARC0 Pipeline Co., Inc., Sohio Pipeline Co., Humble 
Pipeline Co., Mobil Pipeline Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Amerada Hess Corp., and Union 
Oil Co. of California. Dominick & Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. 
Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 337-38 n.3 
(1973). 
Alyeska, the real party in interest, was the party who requested the permits from the 
Department of the Interior. Alyeska intervened to ensure that its interests were properly 
represented in the litigation. 
5. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. I, 9 101, 87 Stat. 576, amending 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, § 28, 30 U.S.C. 5 185 (1970) (codified at 30 U.S.C. 5 
185 (Supp. 111, 1973)); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act §§  201 et seq., 43 U.S.C. 
§§  1651 et seq. (Supp. 111, 1973). 
6. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), reu'd sub non. 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
7. Id. a t  1036-37. 
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dictates the exceptions to the general "American rule" against 
awarding attorneys' fees to the successful litigant, the federal 
courts are not free to fashion new rules for allowance of such fees, 
and that federal courts should not adopt the private attorney 
general approach when it will operate only against private parties 
and not against the government. 
In contrast to the English rule entitling the prevailing party 
to collect his attorneys' fees from the loser,s the American rule is 
that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable as costs from 
the losing party.g 
A. Statutes Affecting the American Rule 
The court-created American rule against fee shifting devel- 
oped early in this country's history.1° Statutes in force during the 
period from 1789 to 1799 required federal courts to award attor- 
neys' fees according to the practice of the courts of the state in 
which they sat." From 1799 to 1853, federal courts continued to 
8. Among the justifications most often given for the English rule are the following: 
(1) it fully compensates the successful litigant by allowing him to recover counsel fees; 
(2) it discourages specious claims; (3) it encourages meritorious claims by the promise of 
reimbursement of fees; (4) it encourages settlements; (5) it enables more financially bur- 
dened plaintiffs to bring suit. See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 54.70 [2], a t  1304 (2d 
ed. 1975). 
9. Among the justifications most often given for the American rule are the following: 
(1) it encourages resolution of controversies through the courts by removing the threat of 
paying an adversary's counsel fees; (2) it enhances predictability and thus promotes the 
security and confidence of the prospective litigant; (3) the time, expense, and difficulty 
of proof inherent in determining reasonable attorneys' fees argue against fee shifting; (4) 
uncertainties of litigation might make an award unjust; (5) attorneys' fees are potentially 
excessive; (6) one should not be penalized for prosecuting or defending a lawsuit; (7) fee 
shifting would flood the courts with litigation. See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier 
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); 6 J. MOORE, supra note 8, 7 54.70 [2], at  1304. 
A number of attacks on the American rule have recently been launched. See, e.g., 
King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 
41 TENN. L. REV. 27 (1973); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 
49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees: A New Method 
of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORD. L. REV. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included 
in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); Comment, Court 
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U .  PA. L. REV. 636, 648-55 
(1974); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 
1216 (1967). 
10. Speaking about fee awards in 1796, the Supreme Court stated, "The general 
practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice were 
not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, 
or modified, by statute." Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). 
11. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 248 n.19 (1975). 
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refer to state rules governing fee awards although the legislative 
authority for doing so had expired.12 In 1853, Congress standard- 
ized costs awarded in federal courts by limiting the sums recover- 
able from the losing party to specified amounts.13 
The 1853 cost statute was reenacted in substantially the 
same language until 1948.14 When interpreting pre-1948 cost stat- 
utes, the United States Supreme Court almost uniformly held 
that "costs" means amounts assessable under such statutes and 
does not include attorneys' fees? In 1948, the ?hrase used in the 
previous acts that "no other compensation [than that prescribed 
by the statute] shall be . . . allowed" was deleted.16 No major 
change has been made in the cost statute since 1948.17 
B. Exceptions to the American Rule 
The American rule has been subject to an increasing number 
of exceptions, falling generally into contractual, statutory, and 
equitable categories. Under the contractual class of exceptions, 
fees are shifted when parties to a contract have made specific 
provision for such a shift? Under the statutory exceptions, the 
fee award is legislatively authorized. These statutory exceptions 
to the American rule variously (1) require mandatory awards for 
the successful plaintiff,lg (2) permit awards for the successful 
12. Id. a t  250 & nn.22 & 23. 
13. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 175, § 12, 10 Stat. 161-62, provides in pertinent part: 
[Vhe following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed. . . . 
Fees of Attorneys, Solicitors, and Proctors. In a trial before a jury, in civil 
and criminal causes, or before referees, or on a final hearing in equity or admi- 
ralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars: . . . . 
14. See Rev. Stat. $ 4  823-24, a t  154 (1874); Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 297, 36 
Stat. 1168-69; 28 U.S.C. $ 4  571-72 (1926). 
15. See The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869) (an attorney may charge his 
client reasonably for his services but the cost of those services may not be taxed against 
the opposite party); I n  re Paschal, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 483, 493 (1870) (between party and 
party in a cause, the statutory fee bill fixes the amount of costs to  be recovered); Flanders ' 
v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450, 452-53 (1872) (it is well settled that lawyers' fees cannot 
be taxed against the opposite party); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 
U.S. 1, 9 (1930) ("costs" means amounts taxable under statutory enactment and does not 
include attorneys' fees); Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 U.S. 451, 452 (1932) ("The only costs 
allowed to be included in the money judgement against petitioner are those taxable as 
between party and party; counsel fees or other expenses not so taxable are not to be 
included."); cf. Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 230-31 (1872). 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1948). 
17. Id. (1970). 
18. See 2 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES ch. 15 (1973). 
19. See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 309(f), 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970); 
Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act of 1930, 7g(b), 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970); 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l) (1970); Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 4 
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plaintiff a t  the court's discretion,1° or (3) permit awards for the 
prevailing party (whether plaintiff or defendant) a t  the court's 
discretion.ll Under the equitable exceptions, federal courts em- 
ploy their historic equity powers to allow fees when "the interests 
of justice so require."22 
The equitable category of exceptions may be further subdi- 
vided into four specific exceptions: bad faith, common fund, sub- 
stantial benefit, and private attorney general. The bad faith ex- 
ception is applied to award fees as a punitive measure when "the 
main ground of the suit is false, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or 
oppre~sive."~~ The common fund exception is traditionally ap- 
plied where the successful party has created, protected, or 
brought into court a fund in which others have an interest; the 
fee award is exacted from the fund to prevent the holders of those 
other interests from being unjustly enriched.14 The substantial 
15 (1970); Unfair Competition Act § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); Truth in Lending Act § 
130(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970); Consumer Product Safety Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. 5 
2073 (Supp. In, 1973); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) 
(1970); Norris-La Guardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act § 
16(b), 29 U.S.C. $ 216(b) (1970); Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 3(p), 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) 
(1970); Shipping Act of 1916, § 30, 46 U.S.C. § 829 (1970); Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, § 
30(c), 46 U.S.C. § 941(c) (1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, § 810, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 
(1970); Communications Act of 1934, § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970); Interstate Commerce 
Act of 1887, $5  8, 15(9), 16(2), 308(b), 49 U.S.C. $0 8, 15(9), 16(2), 908(b) (1970). 
20. See, e.g., Educational Amendments of 1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 111, 
1973); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, §§ 201(c), 501(b), 29 
U.S .C . 0 0 43l(c), 501(b) (1970); Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act 
§ 28, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 11, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a- 
3(b) (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 706e-5(k), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(k) (1970); 
Fair Housing Act of 1958, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). 
21. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1898, $§ 241-44, 11 U.S.C. $ 5  641-44 (1970); Securi- 
ties Act of 1933, 5 l l (e) ,  15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, $ 8  
9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. $ 5  78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Trust Indenture Act $ 5  315, 323, 15 U.S.C. 
$ §  7Oooo(e), 77www(a) (1970); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 111, 
1973); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(g)(4) (Supp. III,1973); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); Servicemen's Readjust- 
ment Act § 5(c), 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970); Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 14, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 19731(e) (Supp. Oct. 1975); Noise Control Act 8 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 49ii(d) (Supp. ID, 
1973). 
22. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). 
23. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928), reu'd 
on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930). The bad faith rationale may also be used to award 
counsel fees for contempt of court, Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 
399 (1923); fraud perpetrated upon the court, Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining 
Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946) (dictum); and willful and persistent default in performing a clear 
statutory duty, Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U S .  527 (1962). See 20 AM. JUR. 2~ Costs § 74 
(1965). 
24. In the seminal case of Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), the plaintiff, 
who acted as a trustee by suing on behalf of other bondholders to prevent waste and 
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benefit exception is applied where (1) the litigation confers a 
substantial but not necessarily pecuniary benefit upon a class, (2) 
the members of the benefited class are ascertainable, and (3) the 
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes 
possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportion- 
ately among the class.25 
C.  The Private Attorney General Exception 
The private attorney general concept was first introduced as 
a basis for standing to sue.26 The recent trend expanding applica- 
tion of the concept to allow awards of attorneys' fees stemmed 
destruction of a fund, was held to be entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees from 
the fund. The Court reasoned that allowing the plaintiff alone to shoulder the cost of 
litigation would provide unjust enrichment to others in the bondholder class. Id. at 532- 
34. 
In Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), a depositor, who successfully 
sued a bank to protect her trust deposits by impressing a lien on the proceeds of bonds, 
established a right of recovery for other trust depositors. In granting the request for 
attorneys' fees, the Court held that although the usual case does create a fund for the 
benefit of a class, the fact that the plaintiff neither purported to sue for a class nor formally 
established a fund did not affect the Court's equity power to award fees. Id. at 166-67. 
Sprague is significant as a departure from the traditional fund case requirements, presag- 
ing the substantial benefit rationale. For another case employing the common fund excep- 
tion, see Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); cf. Hobbs v. McLean, 
117 U.S. 567 (1886). 
See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 
87 HAW. L. REV. 1597 (1974). 
25. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970). Under this excep- 
tion, the costs are not actually paid by the class but by the corporation, union, or other 
entity in which the class has a direct interest. 
In Mills, stockholders instituted an action to set aside a corporate merger procured 
through misleading proxy solicitation. Even though the suit had not produced and per- 
haps would never produce a fund, the Court held that shareholders, "who have established 
a violation of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, should be reim- 
bursed by the corporation or its survivor for the costs of establishing the violation." Id. a t  
389-90, 392. In contrast to the pecuniary benefit to the corporation required by the com- 
mon fund cases, "corporate therapeutics" or vindication of statutory policy were deemed 
significant enough benefits under the substantial benefit exception. Id. a t  393-96. 
The substantial benefit exception was further established as an independent excep- 
tion in Hall v.  Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), in which a union member expelled from his union 
sought reinstatement and damages. The Court held that by vindicating his own right of 
free speech, plaintiff rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution and to 
all of its members. Id. a t  8. Neither a fund nor pecuniary benefit were involved in Hall; 
the fee award was based solely on the substantial common benefit derived from the suit. 
See generally Comment, The Changing American Rule Against Attorney Fee Shift- 
ing: Mills v .  Electric Auto-Lite Co. and Hall v.  Cole, 28 Sw. L.J. 542 (1974); Comment, 
The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
316 (1971). 
26. See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 
U.S. 707 (1943). 
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from the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises, I ~ C . ~ '  It should be emphasized, however, that 
the fee award in Newman was statutorily a u t h o r i ~ e d . ~ ~  Lower 
courts evolved the equitable private attorney general exception 
from Newman in cases where statutes were silent as to fee 
award~.~"s expressed in Newman, attorney's fees may be 
awarded to a prevailing private attorney general who has acted 
in the public interest by vindicating congressional policy of the 
highest priority, where enforcement of the law relies in part on 
private litigation, and where the financial burden of private 
enforcement would discourage l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Although lower courts 
have varied in their emphasis of which of these elements are most 
important, they have generally followed the Supreme Court's 
approach and required the presence of all of the listed elements.31 
27. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). 
It has been suggested that socially conscious application of the substantial benefit 
rationale led to application of the private attorney general rationale to fee award ques- 
tions. King & Plater, supra note 9, a t  43; Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees 
After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 328 (1971). 
28. 390 U.S. at  401-02. 
29. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Bond v. White, 508 
F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and 
remanded, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 
(1st Cir. 1974); Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairly v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 
598 (5th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Staunton, 
471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 
(5th Cir. 1972); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home 
Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), 
aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
But see Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (4th Cir. 
1972), vacated on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 301 (1973); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access 
to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974). 
30. 390 U.S. a t  402. 
31. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972): 
The rule . . . is that whenever there is nothing in a statutory scheme which 
might be interpreted as precluding it, a "private attorney-general" should be 
awarded attorney's fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy 
which has benefitted a large class of people, and where further the necessity and 
financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award essential. 
The rationale for awarding fees under this exception has been identified variously as 
vindication of strong congressional policy, Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 
(9th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1971); 
championing of the public interest, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 
F.2d 1331, 1333 (1st Cir. 1973); cf. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951-52 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 408 (M.D. Ala. 
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Further, the lower courts have not been hesitant to apply the 
exception; courts of appeals of seven circuits have adopted and 
applied the exception in numerous post-Newman cases.32 
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-two decision,33 concluded 
that none of the traditional exceptions to the American rule were 
involved in A l y e ~ k a . ~ ~  Noting the explicit but varied statutory 
exceptions to the American rule and the role of Congress in deter- 
mining which public policies are significant enough to warrant 
statutory fee shifting, the Court concluded that "the circum- 
stances under which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the 
range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are mat- 
ters for Congress to determine."35 
The Court reasoned that it would be difficult for the courts 
to weigh the relative importance of various statutes, to decide 
whether awards should be mandatory or discretionary, to fashion 
rules governing whether prevailing defendants as well as prevail- 
ing plaintiffs should be granted awards, and to determine 
whether a presumption for or against awards of fees would ordi- 
narily operate in a case.36 
Finally, the Court explored the confict between the rational 
application of the private attorney general exception and 28 
U.S.C. 4 2412. Section 2412 precludes assessing attorneys' fees 
against the United States except as otherwise provided by stat- 
ute; as a consequence, only the private parties to an action involv- 
ing the United States can be held liable for fee awards. The Court 
concluded that federal courts should not allow fee awards under 
the private attorney general rationale when the award would op- 
1972); or providing the public benefits of legal or social therapeutics, Wilderness Soc'y v. 
Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The flexibility of the exception has led to 
some disparity between the courts, and may be partially responsible for the Court's deci- 
sion in Alyeska. 
32. See cases cited note 29 supra. 
33. Justices Douglas and Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the 
case. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall each filed dissenting opinions, stating that the federal 
courts' equity jurisdiction empowered the courts to award attorneys' fees and that the 
instant case was a proper case for the exercise of that power. 421 U.S. a t  271-88. 
34. Id. at 259. Newman is not controlling since the fee award in that case was statuto- 
rily authorized. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. 
35. Id. a t  262. The Court also pointed out that congressional reliance on private 
enforcement to implement public policy does not grant authority to the courts to award 
nonstatutory fees. Id. at 263. 
36. Id. at 263-64. 
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erate only against private parties and not against the govern- 
 lent.^' 
This case note first questions whether Congess has reserved 
for itself the issue of fee awards. Second, it analyzes the proper 
scope of the federal courts' equity jurisdiction in light of evolving 
equitable exceptions to the American rule and the Supreme 
Court's interpretations of various statutory provisions for fee 
awards. Third, the case note examines the problems that could 
be encountered in applying the private attorney general exception 
insofar as they bear on the Court's decision. Finally, the propriety 
of the Court's decision and its implications for future public inter- 
est litigation are explored. 
A. Congressional Reservation of the Fee Award Issue 
The requirement of early cost statutes that "no other corn- 
pensation [than that prescribed by the statute] shall be . . . 
allowed" was deleted in 1948.38 In addition, rather than stating 
that the designated fees39 "shall" be assessed, section 1920, the 
current cost statute, states that they "may" be assessed as costs. 
The Court in Alyeska attempted to minimize the importance of 
these changes by finding no clearly expressed intent to depart 
from the previous rule.40 The changes in statutory language de- 
scribed above, however, are too signifcant to justify the assump- 
tion that no change in policy was intended. The 1948 changes in 
the Code suggest that the courts may now exercise their discre- 
tion in awarding fees in equity. 
It is true that Congress has from time to time determined 
that certain public policies are significant enough to warrant fee 
shifting and has therefore made explicit provision for fee awards 
in many widely differing statutes.41 Nevertheless, by failing to 
statutorily limit the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
Congress may have purposely refrained from reserving exclusively 
for itself the issue of fee awards.42 It is both logical and acceptable 
37. Id. a t  265-69. 
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1948). Compare this statute with statutes cited note 14 supra. 
39. The designated fees are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1921-23 (1970). 
40. "[A] well-established principle governing the interpretation of provisions altered 
in the 1948 revision is that 'no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed.' " 421 
U.S. a t  256 n.29, quoting Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 (1972). 
41. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra. 
42. The Court addressed the issue of implied statutory limitations on federal courts' 
general equity jurisdiction in Porter u. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946): 
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for the courts to declare that fee shifting "is consistent with a 
remedy increasingly furnished by C~ngress , "~~ and to view such 
statutory remedies as examples of areas of significant public con- 
cern rather than as evidence of reservation of the fee award issue. 
Clearly Congress has the power to limit the equity jurisdiction of 
federal courts and circumscribe remedial fee shifting,44 but no 
recent Supreme Court decision until Alyeska recognized the cur- 
rent cost statute as mandating such a result.45 Indeed, the Court 
had previously characterized the cost statute as an exception to 
the judicially created American rule.46 It would appear that the 
Court's emphasis on the cost statute in Alyeska is a makeweight 
argument attempting to buttress a conclusion already arrived at 
by the Court. 
B. The Proper Scope of the Federal Courts' Equity Powers 
The Court's holding that federal courts are not free to fashion 
new rules governing the allowance of attorneys' feesm is overbroad 
for three reasons. 
I .  Equity jurisdiction empowers federal courts to fashion new 
rules 
In 1939, the Court held that allowance of extra-statutory 
costs such as attorneys' fees "in appropriate situations is part of 
the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts."48 In speak- 
[Vhe comprehensiveness of . . . equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied 
or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a 
statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts 
the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be 
recognized and applied. 
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
43. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
44. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 ,9  (1973). In Fleischman Distilling Corp. v.  Maier Brewing 
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967), the Court held that the meticulous detail of remedies 
available under the Lanham Act and the failure in Congress of several attempts to include 
a provision for fee awards precluded fee shifting. 
45. Compare the present case with F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial 
Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 
412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing 
Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). 
46. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 & n.11 
(1967). 
47. 421 U.S. at 269. 
48. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939). "Plainly the foundation 
for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than 
the conventional taxable costs is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do 
equity in a particular situation." Id. a t  166. 
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ing of general equitable powers, the Court has explained that 
"[tlhe essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the 
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessi- 
ties of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has 
distinguished it."4g Elsewhere, the Court has stated that courts of 
equity may go much farther in advancing the general public in- 
terest than they are accustomed to when only private interests are 
involved.50 Since "[q]uestions of costs in . . . equity are discre- 
tionary and the action of the court is presumptively correct,"51 fee 
awards under the private attorney general exception should be 
upheld in proper situations. 
2. All equitable exceptions to the American rule have been 
created subsequent to enactment of cost statutes 
All of the equitable exceptions to the American rule have 
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court itself after cost statutes 
had already been enacted. For example, the common fund cases 
of Trustees v .  G r e e n ~ u g h ~ ~  and Sprague v .  Ticonic National 
Bank53 were decided under cost statutes allowing "no other com- 
pensation" than that statutorily prescribed. The current practice 
of specifically awarding attorneys' fees under the bad faith excep- 
tion also developed under restrictive cost statutes.54 If the courts 
may create these exceptions when statutes allow "no other com- 
pensation" than that prescribed, certainly no legal or logical im- 
pediment could exist to bar the creation of a private attorney 
general exception when no such statutory preclusion exists.55 Fur- 
49. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
Indeed, the Court has stated that "individualization in the exercise of a discretionary 
power will alone retain equity as a living system and save it from sterility." Sprague v. 
Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). 
50. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383 (1965). 
51. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78, 83 (1924). 
52. 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The common fund rationale was first noted in Bronson u. 
La Crosse & Mil. R.R., 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 283, 312 (1863), ten years after enactment of the 
1853 cost statute. 
53. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). 
54. See cases cited note 23 supra. Courts now specifically use the amount of attor- 
neys' fees as the measure of damages awarded under the bad faith exception; however, 
one year before enactment of the 1853 cost statute, the Court held that attorneys' fees 
"cannot be taken as a measure of punishment" when awarding exemplary damages for 
bad faith, indicating that the current practice under the bad faith exception developed 
subsequent to the passage of cost statutes. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,371 
(1852). 
55. The Court has stated that in equity, "costs not otherwise governed by statute are 
given or withheld in the sound discretion of the court according to the facts and circum- 
stances of the case." Kansas City S. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1, 9 (1930) 
(dictum). 
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ther, the substantial benefit exception was promulgated by the 
Supreme Court while 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which deleted the "no 
other compensation" language, was in effect.56 Even if the "no 
other compensation" language is implied in section 1920, a possi- 
bility the Court entertained in Alye~ka,~'  the Court's recent crea- 
tion of the substantial benefit exception is a continuing indica- 
tion that federal courts remain free to fashion new rules with 
respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees, including the private 
attorney general exception. 
3. The Court has freely developed new rules in its treatment of 
statutory provisions for fees 
Finally, an analysis of the Court's treatment of various statu- 
tory provisions for attorneys' fees lends further support to the 
proposition that federal courts have continuing freedom to fash- 
ion new rules. Section 204(b) of title I1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 explicitly provides that the prevailing party is entitled to 
reasonable attorneys' fees in the court's d i s ~ r e t i o n . ~ ~  The Court 
altered the specific provisions of that statute by declaring that 
one who obtains an injunction under title I1 "should ordinarily 
recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would ren- 
der such an award unjust."59 The Court thus transformed a dis- 
cretionary award into a virtually mandatory award.60 In another 
case, the plaintiff brought suit under section 14(a) of the Securi- 
ties Exchange Act of 1934,BL which makes no provision for fee 
awards. Although express provisions for recovery of attorneys' 
fees are found in sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the Act for other types 
of suits, the Court held that neither the fee provisions in the other 
sections nor the absence of express statutory authorization for an 
award of attorneys' fees in section 14(a) precluded such an 
award.62 
-- 
56. The change was made in the 1948 revision of the Code. The major cases establish- 
ing the substantial benefit exception are Mills u. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 
(1970), and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
57. 421 U.S. a t  256 n.29. 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)(1970). ''[Yhe court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the Unitd States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the 
costs . . . ." 
59. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968); accord, North- 
cross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973). 
60. As one commentator pointed out, "No logical imperative leads to the conclusion 
that Congress intended a mandatory fee. If Congress had so intended, it could have 
explicitly done so." 4 HARv. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 223, 225 (1969). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). 
62. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970). But cf. F.D. Rich Co. 
v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischman Distilling 
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These decisions illustrate the activity of the Court in altering 
or implying fee award provisions in statutes. When the Supreme 
Court has itself been so active in this area, it can only damage 
its credibility by holding that Congress has reserved this policy 
question for itself. Congressional enactments may have combined 
with Court decisions to establish a general American rule against 
fee awards that cannot be wholly abrogated by unilateral court 
action, but the equity courts clearly may depart from the rule 
when "the interests of justice SO require."" Concern should there- 
fore be focused not on whether the courts have power to award 
fees in equity under the private attorney general exception, but 
on when such an award would be appropriate. 
C. Problems in Applying the Private Attorney General 
Exception 
The Supreme Court was properly concerned about potential 
difficulties in applying the private attorney general exception. 
The exception could be a vehicle for abuse if it were used, as some 
have suggested, to award fees to the successful plaintiff in every 
case arguably promoting societal benefit." Narrowing the scope 
of the exception would necessarily entail greater demands on the 
courts since each case would require detailed analysis of whether 
it fit specified criteria for the award. Unfortunately, the Court 
concluded prematurely that the task would be too difficult for the 
judiciary. 
1. Identifying statutes important enough to justify nonstatutory 
fee awards 
In reviewing the potential problems of applying the private 
attorney general exception, the Court first contended that "it 
would be difficult, indeed, for the courts without legislative guid- 
ance to consider some statutes important and others unimportant 
and to allow attorney's fees only in connection with the former."s5 
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). 
Along the same line is Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), wherein the Court held that 
congressional authorization of fees in §§ 201(c) and 501(b) of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,29 U.S.C. § 5 431 (c), 501 (b), and the absence of such 
authorization in § 102 of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412, did not dictate an intent to preclude 
fee awards under $ 102. 412 U S .  a t  5. 
63. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). 
64. See, e.g., Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees To The "Private Attorney General": 
Judicial Green Light To Private Litigation In The Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 
758 (1973); Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 328 (1971). 
65. 421 US.  a t  263-64. 
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Congress is undoubtedly the branch of government best suited to 
formulate public policies based on thorough research and evalua- 
tion.'"et it would often be possible for the Court to discern the 
relative "importance" of legislationw from statutory statements 
of purpose,68 inferences drawn from language in related statutes,69 
records of congressional debates,70 or statements of executive offi- 
cers or agencies." The Court could have seized upon the oppor- 
tunity presented by Alyeska to establish workable guidelines for 
handling marginal cases,72 thus curtailing any anticipated flood 
of litigation under this exception. 
2. Determining under what conditions and to  whom a n  award 
should be made 
The Court was also troubled by whether a presumption 
should operate for or against the award, whether awards should 
- 
66. Although the courts lack the time and machinery to research public policy, some 
commentators have argued that the courts are actually in the best position to sense 
changes in public policy direction and to adapt to them. See, e.g., J. SAX, DEFENDING THE 
ENVIRONMENT ch. 4 (1970); Sive, Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness 
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970). 
67. For example, the courts promptly recognized the significance of civil rights legis- 
lation. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (right to jury trial under fair 
housing statute); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (school desegrega- 
tion); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (standing granted to 
maintain balanced racial atmosphere in apartment house complex); Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (school desegregation); Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (racial discrimination in public accommoda- 
tions). 
68. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 9 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 
4331(c) (1970): "The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful envi- 
ronment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and 
enhancement of the environment." 
69. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505(d), 33 
U.S.C. 4 1365(d) (Supp. 111, 1973); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, § 105(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. III,1973); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 
§ 340(d), 42 U.S.C. 5 1857h-2(d) (1970); Noise Control Act, § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) 
(Supp. 111, 1973). 
70. See the Court's reliance on statements of Congressmen in the instant case, 421 
U.S. a t  251 & n.24, 262 n.36. 
71. See, e.g., President Nixon's August 1971 Message to Congress, 7 WEEKLY COMP. 
OF PRES. DOC. 1133 (1971): 
In the final analysis, the foundation on which environmental progress rests 
in our society is a responsible and informed citizenry. My confidence that our 
Nation will meet its environmental problems in the years ahead is based in large 
measure on my faith in the continued vigilance of American public opinion and 
in the continued vitality of citizen efforts to protect and improve the environ- 
ment. 
The National Environmental Policy Act has given a new dimension to 
citizen participation and citizen rights . . . . 
72. See notes 82-89 and accompanying text infra. 
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be discretionary or mandatory, and whether fee awards should be 
granted to prevailing plaintiffs only or also to prevailing de- 
f e n d a n t ~ . ~ ~  These obstacles are far from insuperable. The general 
American rule already provides a framework to resolve these 
questions. 
Under the American rule a strong presumption, which can be 
overcome only by cases falling within narrow and exacting stric- 
tures, already operates against fee awards.74 Similarly, no 
justification exists for making fee awards mandatory; the basis of 
the present equitable exceptions to the American rule is the 
courts' discretionary equitable power. Finally, the award would 
be granted only to prevailing plaintiffs, as is the accustomed 
procedure under the other equitable  exception^,^^ since awarding 
fees to the prevailing defendants could chill the initiation of im- 
portant litigation and is often unnecessaryin-any event.76 Thus, 
merely by counseling adherence to the tenor of the established 
general rule against fee awards, the Court would have mitigated 
these problems. 
3. Sovereign immunity 
The final problem troubling the Court was the immunity of 
both state77 and federal governments from judgment for attor- 
73. 421 U.S. at 264. 
74. All of the equitable exceptions operate under presumptions against fee awards. 
That Congress occasionally creates presumptions in favor of awards should not affect the 
courts in their handling of nonstatutory awards. Nevertheless, the Court's concern that 
the private attorney general exception would render the American rule the exception 
rather than the rule is implicit in Alyeska. 
For the strictures referred to, see notes 82-89 and accompanying text infra. 
75. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); cf .  Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 
567, 581-82 (1886). 
76. The defendant in any public interest suit would probably be a "sufficiently large 
entity" to assume the cost of litigation or pass the cost on to consumers. Note, Awarding 
Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 
1241 n.114 (1973). 
However, courts could stipulate that frivolous nuisance suits would be grounds for 
awarding fees to the defendant under the bad faith rationale. See Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337-38 (1st Cir. 1973) (dictum). 
77. Consideration of the sovereign immunity of state governments lies outside the 
scope of this case note. Several recent articles have treated the matter, however. See, e.g., 
Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against States After 
Edelman v. Jordan, 46 MISS. L.J. 249 (1975); Comment, Who is to Guard the Guardians: 
Awarding Attorneys' Fees Against a State Defendant in Public Benefit Litigation, 9 U .  
SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 465 (1975); Comment, The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar 
an Award of Attorney's Fees Based on the Private Attorney General Theory, 32 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 133 (1975): 
Compare Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), with Taylor v. Perini, 
503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974). 
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neys' fees. Since 28 U.S.C. Q 241278 precludes fee awards against 
the federal government absent a contrary statutory provision, the 
Court rightly indicated that "the rational application of the pri- 
vate attorney general rule would immediately collide with the 
express provision of 28 U.S.C. Q 2412."79 Because many successful 
public interest suits are brought against government agencies, an 
award of attorneys' fees against the federal government would 
often be appropriate under the private attorney general excep- 
tion." Unless Congress alters section 2412, however, that remedy 
is unquestionably not available. Even so, its unavailability 
should not have led the Court to deny any remedy whatsoever; a 
partial remedy, such as an assessment of part of the attorneys' 
fees against the private party or parties defendant, as was 
awarded to Wilderness Society by the court of appeals,81 is better 
than none. In effect, the Supreme Court's holding in Alyeska is 
an unjustified judicial extension of 28 U.S.C. Q 2412 to private 
parties. 
4. Guidelines for implementing the private attorney general 
exception 
The Supreme Court should have allowed trial courts to ex- 
amine the following factors under the private attorney general 
exception to determine if the plaintiff has overcome the presump- 
tion against a fee award: 1) whether the party p r e ~ a i l e d ; ~ ~  2) 
whether the suit vindicated strong congressional policy;83 3) 
78. That statute provides: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, 
as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expen- 
ses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action 
brought by or against the United States or any agency or official of the United 
States acting in his official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such 
action. 
(emphasis added). 
The Senate Report on the bill that amended O 2412 to its present form stated that 
"[tlhe costs referred to in the section do not include fees and expenses of attorneys." S. 
REP. NO. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966). 
79. 421 U.S. at  265-66. 
80. In addition, federal tax receipts create the fund from which an award could be 
made under the common fund or substantial benefit rationales. 
81. Alyeska was required to pay one-half the reasonable value of attorneys' fees 
incurred by Wilderness Society. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (en banc). The court of appeals acted with considerable discretion in requiring 
Alyeska, the real party in interest, to pay only the amount it would have paid had the 
government also been liable, rather than the entire amount of Wilderness Society's legal 
fees. 
82. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968). In other words, 
was the party wholly successful in some important aspect of the suit? 
83. Did the plaintiff vindicate a clearly demonstrable "policy Congress considered of 
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whether the suit advanced broad public interests or rights;84 4) 
whether the suit created significant public benefit;" 5) whether 
the necessity for private enforcement exi~ted;~' 6) whether the 
comparative resources of the opposing parties and the financial 
burden of private enforcement suggested an award;" 7) whether 
an adequate basis existed for shifting fees to the losing party (as 
contrasted with shifting fees from the winning party);88 8) 
whether the case was meri tor io~s.~~ These guidelines could act as 
strictures limiting the range of discretion available to federal 
courts in awarding attorneys' fees. 
D. Implications of the Decision 
The broad holding of Alyeska was unnecessary for resolving 
the narrow conflict of the particular parties involved in the litiga- 
tion?O Because the Court decided to reach the broader issues, 
the highest priority?" Id. Would the legislative purpose of an act be frustrated by a refusal 
to award fees? 
84. Questions to be considered here are the following: Are the basic issues of substan- 
tial public importance? Is the public interest involved so vital as to be subsidized by an 
award? 
85. Questions to be considered in resolving this issue are the following: Are the 
societal benefits widespread? Does the benefit extend beyond the actual litigants? Is the 
plaintiff advancing essentially private or public interests? Is the benefit questionable? 
Would an award in this case help to vindicate the rights of others in similar situations? 
Does the suit yield significant service to the Nation, the general public, a community, a 
race, or other large class? Would a fee award aid enforcement of federal laws or render 
other service to the legal system? Would an award have a deterrent effect on other viola- 
tors? 
86. Questions to be considered in resolving this issue are the following: Does the 
governing statute preclude, allow, rely on, or require enforcement via private suits? Does 
vindication largely rest with private individuals? Can public officials adequately investi- 
gate violations and enforce the laws? 
87. Questions requiring consideration in resolving this issue include the following: 
Does the financial burden of private enforcement render a fee award essential? Would the 
absence of an award penalize the plaintiff for civic-minded and beneficial litigation and 
prevent him from bringing suit in future public interest controversies? Would the possibil- 
ity of an award discourage a party from defending the suit or intervening to protect his 
interests? Would a fee award give too much financial incentive for bringing future litiga- 
tion? Can the cost of the award be passed on to the group-benefited by the litigation? 
88. Was the party against whom the award is souglit the actual violator of the stat- 
ute? If the defendant prevailed, was the suit so frivolous as to justify an award in his favor? 
See 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 216 (1975). 
89. In sum, is this such an exceptional case that dominating reasons of justice require 
that an award of attorneys' fees be granted? See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 US. 
161, 167 (1939). 
90. Narrower grounds on which the decision not to award fees could have been based 
are: (1) The congressional amendments allowing construction of the pipeline indicated 
that rather than vindicate a strong congressional policy, Wilderness Society had acted in 
opposition to the prevailing policy. (2) It is highly unlikely that a mere technicality such 
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Alyeska appears to be yet another in a line of cases tending to 
discourage public interest suits? Whether or not that is true, the 
Court's overbroad holding contains grave implications for future 
public interest litigation. 
1. Implications for future litigation 
If it is assumed that public interest actions by concerned 
citizens are inherently valuable," particularly in fields such as 
civil rights, the way should be cleared for the institution of such 
actions. This is especially true where a violation of a statute 
causes little harm to any one individual but great harm to impor- 
tant public interests. In many cases the Nation must rely on 
as the proper width of rights-of-way would be the subject for strong congressional policy. 
Focus here should be on the statutory provisions in question, not on environmental protec- 
tion in general. (3) The resolution of rights-of-way disputes could hardly be termed an 
advancement of broad public interests. (4) The Department of the Interior, not Alyeska, 
was the actual violator in this case, so fees should not have been awarded at Alyeska's 
expense. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); 
NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 
455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 
100, 111 (9th Cir. 1972) (fees should not be assessed where there is substantial doubt as 
to the legal obligation of the defendant). (5) Assuming arguendo that the general public 
would have benefited them the suit, no evidence showed that the cost of the award could 
be passed on to them. (6) The award granted by the court of appeals covered issues under 
the National Environmental Policy Act on which the plaintiffs had not succeeded. 495 
F.2d at 1034. (7) Since plaintiffs' lawyers had represented that they did not expect reim- 
bursement for their pro bono public0 effort, 495 F.2d at 1042-43 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), 
and since plaintiffs were large privately-funded foundations, necessity for the award was 
lacking. (8) The Nation was in the midst of an "energy crisis" that rendered development 
of a domestic oil supply, including completion of the trans-Alaska pipeline, a matter of 
substantial national concern. 
91. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208 
(1974) (standing to sue-"generalized citizen interest" is not a sufficient basis for standing 
to sue); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (class action-individual notice 
is reguired in class actions even though the cost might be prohibitive); O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488 (1974) (concreteness-threat of injury to the class is too remote to satisfy 
the "case or controversy" requirement); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (concrete- 
ness-no specific present or future objective harm); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 
(1972) (standing to sue-a litigant not properly in court because of an individualized 
injury cannot use "public interest" as the basis for standing to sue); Boyle v. Landry, 401 
U.S. 77 (1971) (concreteness-allegations lacked showing of threat of irreparable injury 
to the class bringing suit); Snyder v. Hams, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (class action-each 
member of a class in a diversity action must meet the requisite federal jurisidictional 
amount of $10,000). 
92. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100-01 (N.D. Cal. 1972). This type of 
litigation is different from mere private cases between individuals; it is inappropriate to 
view the parties as engaged in a routine private lawsuit. See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 
U.S. 696, 718 (1974). 
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private litigation to ensure broad compliance with the law.93 
Those injured should be encouraged to seek judicial relief. Since 
public interest suits so often seek injunctive relief rather than 
money damages, only by awarding attorneys' fees can courts en- 
courage such litigation. 
2. Alternative avenues to fee awards i n  future litigation 
One avenue remaining open to federal courts desirous of 
awarding fees to successful public interest litigants is to expand 
the use of the bad faith and substantial benefit exceptions. A 
party whose violation of a statute evidences flagrant disregard for 
the public interest could be declared guilty of bad faith, providing 
a basis for shifting fees to that party. This type of fee award based 
on flouting of the law is supported by some casesg4 and commenta- 
tors." It should be noted, however, that the evidentiary burden 
in establishing bad faith would frequently preclude awardsg%nd 
that this remedy has ordinarily been applied in private rather 
than public suits. Expanded application of the bad faith excep- 
tion would require substantial stretching of the doctrine. 
Fee awards based on the substantial benefit exception have 
also been supported by courtsg7 and  commentator^.^^ This ap- 
proach is more consistent with Alyeska and the American rule 
since costs are spread among the beneficiaries rather than as- 
sessed against the opposite party. The drawbacks of this excep- 
tion are that the benefits must be clearly traceable to an ascer- 
tainable class of beneficiaries, the beneficiaries must have per- 
formed some voluntary act that implies assent to involuntary 
93. 421 U.S. a t  263; Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 
(1968). 
94. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) (disregard for statutory duty to 
private interest); Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968) (judicial prodding to ensure 
desegregation justifies fee award); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 
1963) (punitive damages). 
95. See, e.g., Note, Awarding of Attorneys' Fees i n  School Desegregation Cases: De- 
mise of the Bad-Faith Standard, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 371 (1972); Note, Allowance of 
Attorney Fees i n  Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 381 (1971); Note, 
Allowance of Attorney Fees i n  Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action Is Not  Based on 
a S ta tu te  Providing For a n  Award of Attorney Fees, 41 U .  CIN. L. REV. 405 (1972). 
96. King & Plater, supra note 9, a t  59-60. 
97. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1333 
& n.1 (1st Cir. 1973); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1972). 
98. Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees i n  Environmental Litigation, 
58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1236-37 (1973); Note, T h e  Allocation of Attorneys' Fees After 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 328-31 (1971); Note, Attorneys' 
Fees: W h a t  Consti tutes a "Benefit" Su f f ic ien t  t o  Award Fees From Third Party 
Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 271, 284. 
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participation in the costs of vindicating the rights of all the bene- 
f ic iar ie~,~~ and some type of joint resource (such as corporate or 
union assets) from which the award may be drawn must be avail- 
able.loO By definition, the general public is deemed to be the bene- 
ficiary of most public interest litigation; yet the general public 
has contributed to no central fund other than government tax 
revenues exempted by 28 U.S.C. 8 2412 from use in fee awards. 
The exception is therefore of limited value in public interest liti- 
gation, being confined primarily to formally organized classes.lol 
Proponents of public interest litigation should take heart 
from the fact that numerous statutes provide for awards of attor- 
neys' fees in specified types of cases.lo2 In addition, proposals 
before Congress could create means for more effective public in- 
terest litigationlo3 and provide for fee awards under additional 
statutes.lo4 Finally, Alyeska does not affect the ability of state 
courts to award fees under the private attorney general exception. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The actions of both Congress and the Court indicate that 
Congress has not reserved exclusively for itself the question of fee 
awards. The historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts pro- 
vides adequate grounds for the implementation of the private 
attorney general exception. Although difficulties would necessar- 
ily have arisen in applying the exception, guidelines could have 
been established that would have lessened the obstacles. 
In interdicting use of the private attorney general exception 
by federal courts, the Supreme Court passed far beyond the re- 
quirements of the case before it.lo5 The private attorney general 
-- - 
99. King & Plater, supra note 9, at 52-53. 
100. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. 
101. The Court's failure in Alyeska to distinguish the substantial benefit cases from 
the common fund cases could signal a retreat from the broader substantial benefit excep- 
tion to the traditional and more narrow common fund doctrines. See cases cited in 421 
U.S. at 257-58. 
102. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra. 
103. E.g., Consumer Protection Act, S. 200,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (establishing 
the Agency for Consumer Protection; the Senate and the House have passed the bill, but 
President Ford has promised to veto it.). 
104. See, e.g., S. 2278, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees 
Award Act of 1975, allowing awards to the prevailing plaintiff in civil rights suits). Also, 
bills introduced in the House during the first session of the 94th Congress would allow 
attorneys' fee awards under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act (H.R. 7825), in civil suits 
where the interests of justice so require (H.R. 7826), in actions for injunctive relief under 
the Clayton Act (H.R. 7827), to prevailing plaintiffs under civil rights laws (H.R. 7828), 
and under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (H.R. 7829). 
105. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. 
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exception is a concept not yet resolved into clear definition. 
Alyeska presented the Court with the opportunity to shape that 
concept into an acceptable, narrowly defined, workable instru- 
ment of equity. By electing to wholly prohibit fee awards under 
the exception rather than to structure and clarify it, the Court 
squandered an exceptional opportunity to develop a useful equi- 
table doctrine. 
